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Abstract: 
In this paper it is argued that the risk-pooling role of unemployment benefits affects the 
irreversible choices of future labour market entrants. One such ex ante choice is 
education. Some types of education lead to general human capital that lead to almost 
certain employment. Other types of education are more specialised and lead to less 
secure employment. We address this issue in OLG search models that allow for risk-
aversion, heterogeneity in talents, endogenous price formation of different specialisations, 
and competitive wage formation. We find that in the absence of unemployment benefits, 
the percentage of individuals taking high-risk specialised education is inefficiently low. 
Those with higher innate abilities are typically found to take lower degrees of 
specialisation, implying that the relation between wages and risks at the individual level is 
the reverse from what it is at the aggregate level. We find that an unemployment benefit 
(UB) system raises efficiency and welfare because it promotes efficient specialisation. 
Because education takes time, it takes a long time before the composition of the 
workforce has adapted to changing incentives. With a calibrated model we explore such 
lags between unexpected changes in circumstances and outcomes. 
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Abstract
In this paper it is argued that the risk-pooling role of unemploy-
ment bene￿ts aﬀects the irreversible choices of future labour market
entrants. One such ex ante choice is education. Some types of ed-
ucation lead to general human capital that lead to almost certain
employment. Other types of education are more specialised and lead
to less secure employment. We address this issue in OLG search mod-
els that allow for risk-aversion, heterogeneity in talents, endogenous
price formation of diﬀerent specialisations, and competitive wage for-
mation. We ￿nd that in the absence of unemployment bene￿ts, the
percentage of individuals taking high-risk specialised education is inef-
￿ciently low. Those with higher innate abilities are typically found to
take lower degrees of specialisation, implying that the relation between
wages and risks at the individual level is the reverse from what it is
at the aggregate level. We ￿nd that an unemployment bene￿t( U B )
system raises eﬃciency and welfare because it promotes eﬃcient spe-
cialisation. Because education takes time, it takes a long time before
the composition of the workforce has adapted to changing incentives.
With a calibrated model we explore such lags between unexpected
changes in circumstances and outcomes.
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11 Introduction and literature
Many studies have looked at the possible advantages of unemployment bene-
￿ts (UB) on the decisions or welfare of an individual after he has entered the
labour market. One such advantage, empirically assessed by Gruber (1997),
is that UB smooths incomes. Another potential bene￿ti st h a tU Bi n c r e a s e s
the outside option of unemployed individuals and hence allows them to make
better decisions (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999, 2000) show that UB give an added incentive for unemployed individu-
als to hold out for jobs that involve a higher risk of lay-oﬀ or that are simply
harder to ￿nd. In their model, this can raise welfare and output for low levels
of UB. In a similar vein Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), extending the basic
argument made at least as early as Burdett (1979), show that when individ-
uals receive unemployment bene￿ts while unemployed, they have a greater
incentive to hold out for ￿better matches￿, i.e., jobs that are higher paying.
The fact that holding out for better matches has an external bene￿cial eﬀect
on the probability that others ￿nd their optimal match, can make UB welfare
and output increasing. It is a disputed empirical question when and whether
such advantages of UB are enough to outweigh the decreased incentives to
search jobs in the presence of moral hazard (e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini,
1997).
In this paper, we add to this literature by looking at the eﬀects that un-
employment bene￿ts have on the economy via its eﬀect on irreversible choices
made before entering the labour market, such as education. Education not
only aﬀects the future level of expected wages, but also ties an individual
to the unemployment risks of the jobs that an individual is then suited for.
Individuals who opt for general education can apply to and function in many
jobs. Hence, their job-arrival rate will be high once they enter the labour
market and their job destruction rate low. Individuals who opt for special-
ist skills however will have a much smaller pool of jobs to search and are
more vulnerable to technology shocks that wipe out the value of specialist
knowledge. Hence the choice for type of education is also a choice for a level
of future risk. This choice may therefore change if the risks or rewards on
the labour market change. The presence of a risk-sharing device like unem-
ployment bene￿ts reduces (the importance of) these risks and therefore will
aﬀect educational choice. This in turn will change unemployment dynamics
and average outcomes, such as average output, and relative wages.
We analyse the importance of risk-relevant irreversible early choices in a
2general equilibrium OLG-model. In the simplest version, identical risk-averse
individuals who live only two periods choose a degree of specialisation in the
￿rst period. Greater specialisation translates to an increased risk of unem-
ployment in the second period. Those who work with a speci￿c specialisation
make intermediaries that are transformed into a homogeneous consumption
good by a continuous CES production function. This production functions
brings out macro-economic complementarities between the activities of indi-
v i d u a l st h a ts of a rh a v ea l w a y sb e e ni g n o r e di ns e a r c hm o d e l s . T h em o d e l
yields an observed wage distribution that is unique and that can have virtu-
ally any shape, depending on the underlying functions.
Introducing unemployment bene￿ts paid for by a single marginal tax
rate turns out to make investments into more risky professions relatively
more attractive. This tilts the distribution of specialisation choices to the
right, which increases production, increases expected utility, and increases
unemployment. In this regard, the insurance provided by UB has the same
eﬀect in this model as in the models by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000)
and Marimon and Zillibotti (1999), albeit via a diﬀerent mechanism. An
empirical prediction of these ￿ndings is that the percentage of individuals
taking general education is less in an area with higher unemployment bene￿ts.
If we view the US as an area with relatively low unemployment bene￿ts and
the countries in the EU as an area with high unemployment bene￿ts, this
would translate in there being more vocational and specialist education in
the EU than in the US. Ashton and Green (1996) have indeed documented
such a diference.
Apart from risks and macro-economic complementarities, innate talents
are also an important determinant of wages. The two-period model is there-
fore generalised to include talent heterogeneity, where talent is understood as
an eﬃciency unit of productivity for any specialisation. This does not alter
the previous conclusions bar one: it then turns out that under most utility
functions, those with highest total wages are then also the ones with least
risks. Those with most talent ￿buy￿ higher security by taking low-risk jobs
whilst their total wages are still higher because of their higher talent levels.
This extended model is hence capable of reconciling the theoretical predic-
tion that individuals would have to get higher wages when running higher
risks and the empirical evidence that suggests that those with higher risks
actually get paid less (e.g. Hwang et al. 1992).
To study the dynamics of the model, we ￿rst extend the two-period model
to an in￿nite period continuous-time OLG model where a higher degree of
3specialisation implies lower job-￿nding rates and higher job-destruction rates.
For the most plausible parametric assumptions, the main conclusions from
the two-period models apply to this continuous case also.
We then calibrate a dynamic 20-period OLG model in section 3, with
which we can study the dynamics of the economy after unanticipated shocks.
We ￿nd that, because educational choices are irreversible, changes in para-
meters tend to have delayed eﬀects. The eﬀect of reducing taxes and unem-
ployment bene￿ts on unemployment takes much longer to work through when
there is a large long-run decrease in the number of specialists, simply because
it takes several cohorts before the new equilibrium mix between generalists
and specialists is achieved. This explanation of unemployment rates com-
bines shocks with institutional factors, is in line with the recommendations
of Blanchard and Wolfers (2001).
General economic shocks turn out to have a longer lasting eﬀect (persis-
tence) in the economy with high unemployment bene￿ts than in the economy
without. This is because the economy with unemployment bene￿ts has more
specialists who have lower job-￿nding rates. Hence, after an economic shock
it takes longer for these individuals to ￿nd a job again than it takes the
generalists, of which there are more in the economy with low unemploy-
ment bene￿ts. This is another explanation for the sluggishness with which
the EU unemployment rates came down after the oil price shocks in the
70￿s (Blanchard en Wolfers, 1999). Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998) explained
this same phenomenon by arguing that unemployment bene￿ts increased the
willingness of individuals to wait for better jobs. Sargent and Ljungqvist
combined this with the assumption that individual loose skills in unemploy-
ment. Hence unemployment bene￿ts aggravated the negative shocks in their
model because the high unemployment bene￿ts indirectly adversely changed
the characteristics of individuals whilst they were already on the labour mar-
ket. The diﬀerence with this paper is that in this paper, there is no resort to
a reduction in skills during unemployment, but an eﬀect of unemployment
bene￿ts on the long term composition of the workforce. Hence this paper
stresses that the US and EU labour market were already very diﬀerent before
the oil price shocks, even if at that moment unemployment bene￿ts would
have been equated. The evidence for the existence of loss-of-skills or stigma
as a result of prolonged unemployment is still very scant (see e.g. Heckman
and Borjas, 1980, Lynch; Frijters, an den Berg and Lindeboom 2001, Bonnal
et al. 1997). This favours explanations of persistent unemployment that do
not require changes in characteristics of individuals during unemployment.
4The ￿nal section concludes.
This paper￿s theoretical contribution is in three main directions. We be-
lieve we are the ￿rst to allow for macro-economic production complementari-
ties in a search model. Previous search models have taken the productivity of
as p e c i ￿c match to be independent of the activities of individuals in diﬀerent
types of activities (Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Moens 1997; Acemoglu and
Shimer 1998; Marimon and Zillibotti 1999; Pissarides 1990 and extensions,
such as Fredriksson and Holmlund 2001 or Petrongolo 2001). Second, we
solve for entire wage distributions in the context of individual heterogeneity
and competitive wage setting. This sets us apart from the extensions of the
Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model that also solve for wage distributions and
individual heterogeneity (e.g. Bontemps et al 2001) but assume that labour
markets are segmented and that not all ￿rms are at the production frontier.
It also sets us apart from Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Moens (1997)
who also have competitive wage setting, but do not solve for distributions
and have no heterogeneity in talents. Finally, this paper is the ￿rst to solve
a continuous time OLG model with risk-aversion, heterogeneity, arbitrary
utility functions, job search and job destruction.
2 A 2-period general equilibrium OLG model
There is a continuum of individuals each period of measure 1. A generation
of ex ante identical individuals lives two periods, where one generation is in
period 1 whilst the previous generation is in period 2. In the ￿rst period,
individuals can choose a level of specialisation 1≥ θ ≥ 0 as their type of
skill in the second period. The cumulative density of individuals at time t
choosing specialisation θ is denoted by Ft(θ)w h e r e
R 1
0 dFt(θ)=1 . Looking
only at steady states, we will drop the time subscripts.
In the second period, individuals search production facilities. The prob-
ability of ￿nding and keeping a job is h(θ) where h(0) = 1, h(1) > 0 and
∂h
∂θ < 0. The specialised jobs are hence by de￿nition harder to ￿nd and\or
keep. A worker produces one unit of a specialisation-speci￿cg o o dw h i c hi s








5where f(θ)h(θ) is the total amount of the intermediary good of type θ
that is produced and where 1 > γ > 0.
Individuals are forward looking risk-averse rational utility maximizers.
Expected utility is
E{U(θ)} = h(θ)u((1 − τ)w(θ)) + (1 − h(θ))u(b) (2)
where τ is the tax rate, and b=
τy R
(1−h)fdθ is the level of unemployment
bene￿ts. Wages are set competitively: w(θ)=
∂y
∂f(θ)h(θ) =( f(θ)h(θ))γ−1y1−γ
when f(θ) exists and w(θ)=0at positive mass points of F(θ). Also, u(.) is
convex, its derivative exists and is continuous, with u(∞)=∞. Non-negative
non-work incomes ensure that u(0)>-∞.1 We restrict initial attention to
cases where b<w (θ).
First, a standard argument holds that in equilibrium, f(θ) has to be
continuous if h(θ) is continuous. The reason is that if f(θ) is not continuous
and, say, drops at some point x, then wages will make a discontinuous jump
at x. There is then a ￿rst order gain to be made for individuals just before
x to change their choice of θ to x, with only a second-order loss of ￿nding a
job.
It is also the case that f(θ)>0 for every θ and every utility function because
w(θ)=∞ when f(θ)=0. Choosing θ will hence be preferred over choices
w i t hw a g e sl e s st h a ni n ￿nite, which ensures that f(θ)>0f o ra n yθ.T h e s e
regularities in f(θ) mean that w(θ) is also continuous when h(θ) is continuous.
Having hence checked that minimal regularity conditions apply, we can
now characterise the equilibrium by noting that each choice of θ must yield
the same expected utility. Diﬀerentiating E{U(θ)} with respect to θ and
setting to 0 gives the main solution equation of this model:
−h
0(θ)(u((1 − τ)w(θ)) − u(b)) = (1 − τ)w
0(θ)h(θ)u
0((1 − τ)w(θ)) (3)
for diﬀerentiable points of h(θ). This equation immediately shows that
wages are increasing in the risk (= 1 − h) and hence increasing in θ.I n
order to judge the eﬃciency of the outcome, consider what would be the out-
put maximizing choice of f(θ), denoted as fe(θ). Due to the properties of the
1This gives a lower bound to the utility function. Without a bound, we would run
into the St. Petersburg paradox, where individuals would not have complete preferences.
For a short discussion on this problem with Von Neumann - Morgenstern expected utility
functions, which was ￿rst noted by Savage, see Aumann (1977).




h . This corresponds to fe(θ) ∝ h(θ)
−γ
γ−1. The equilibrium of
the model is now characterised in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. At τ =0 , the model above has a unique equilibrium solu-
tion f(θ),w h i c hi si n e ﬃcient. Any continuous distribution of observed wages
z(w) can be supported as long as z(x)=0for all 0 <x<w min.
Proof: existence and uniqueness is proven in the Appendix. Ineﬃciency can





h because of the risk-aversion in u(.). This in turn implies
ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. The shape of observed wages z(w) follows because
we can write z(x)= 1
∂h(θ)
∂θ
f(θ) where θ =a r g θ w(θ)=x. Because nothing bounds
w(1)
w(0) from above, any observed continuous density function that is bounded from
below can then be supported by an appropriate choice of h(θ) and u(.).
The intuition behind existence is that the main solution equation uniquely
maps w(θ) as a continuous function of w(0). Conversely, this leads to a
unique f(θ) and y, both continuous in w(0). Because w(0) is itself uniquely
determined by f(0) and y, there is a closing equation for which a ￿xed point
argument shows it has a solution for at least one w(0). Uniqueness then
follows because it is not possible to change f(θ) without increasing some
wages and decreasing others (proven in Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Because
equilibrium implies that individuals have equal utility, it cannot be the case
that there is a second equilibrium in which there are some better oﬀ and
others strictly worse oﬀ.
The question now is whether this outcome can be improved upon by in-
troducing an unemployment bene￿t. Three general results can be obtained:
Proposition 2. i) At 0, an increase in τ is both utility, unemployment and
output increasing. ii) There is a critical level τz above which all individu-
als would prefer not to work where τz solves: (1 − τ)w(0) = b and where
w(θ)=w(0) and f(θ) ∝ h(θ)−1. iii) There is no level of τ that yields eﬃ-
ciency.





h for any θ. In turn this would imply that
u(x) − u(b)=xu0(x) where x =( 1− τ)w(θ). This equation in turn can only
hold for a continuum of x when u00(.)=0and τ =0 , which implies that individ-
uals would have to be risk-neutral which contradicts the primitives of the model.
The proof of i) and ii) is in the Appendix.
The intuition of this result is that at low levels of tax, the introduction
of a bene￿t induces individuals to take more risks, which increases output,
increases unemployment, and increases utility. Because the utility of each
choice is the same, the utility increase following an increase in τ is ex ante
the same for each individual. Because of the irreversibility of specialisation
however, ex post some individuals will not want taxation. The individuals
with θ =0for instance run run no risks ex post and will hence oppose any
tax ex post, even though they have bene￿tted from it ex ante.
The reason that there is no tax level that will yield the maximum output
is that ex post individuals want diﬀerent levels of insurance: given that
individuals will choose diﬀerent risks, the optimal insurance should diﬀer for
diﬀerent levels of risk. The ex post risk-pooling between individuals with
diﬀerent risks means that those who run little risks will be over insured
and those who run high risks will be under insured. This shows up a basic
diﬀerence between considering wage distributions in stead of a single wage
outcome, such as Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), where there is a single tax
that restores eﬃciency.
The key features of this static model are brought out in Figures 1, 2 and
























Figure 1: the relation between risks and the distribution of risk choices.
Parametric assumptions: h(θ)=1− 0.5 ∗ θ, γ =0 .5, and u(y)=y0.1
The straigth lines correspond to model outcomes under various tax regimes,
whereas the dotted line shows the eﬃcient outcome. As is clear, the dis-
tribution of risks when τ =0is too much skewed to the left in compar-
ison to eﬃciency. As τ increases, the distribution becomes less tilted. At
τ =0 .09, the distribution is almost identical to the eﬃcient distribution.
When τ = τz =0 .25, we have the limit case, where all wages are equal and























Figure 2: the relation between wage pro￿les and taxation
Figure 2 shows the wage pro￿le of the same tax regimes. At τ =0 ,
wages rise very fast with risks and hence with θ. As τ increase, the wage
pro￿le becomes less skewed to the right. At τ =0 .09, we get the almost
eﬃcient wage curve. In the very limit case of τ =0 .25, wages are constant.




































Figure 3: the eﬀect of taxation on utility, production, and unemployment
Figure 3 shows the relation between τ one the one hand and utility, pro-
10duction and unemployment. Each three rises quite rapidly for very low levels
of τ. Production peaks very soon, i.e. at τ =0 .09 a n dt h e ns l o w l yl e v e l so ﬀ.
Utility peaks much later at τ =0 .22, and unemployment increases till the
limit of τ =0 .25.
In this homogeneous-worker model there is a negative relationship be-
tween wages and risks: the higher the wages, the higher the risk of unemploy-
ment. This corresponds to the results of the classic hedonic wage literature
that started with Rosen (1972) where individuals pay with lower wages for
good amenities, in this case low risks of unemployment. This trade-oﬀ is also
present in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). It is empirically very implausible
however that the better paid run more chance of being unemployed, except
perhaps for some very high paying jobs such as CEO￿s. Daniel and Sofer
(1998) show that in the majority of empirical studies, the usual ￿nding is
that the higher the wages, the better the amenities, counter to our simple
model￿s prediction. Unemployment levels are for instance generally higher
for individuals at the lower earning potential levels. Individual heterogeneity
plays a major role here: those with lowest wages are generally also those
with the lowest ex ante earning potential. There is hence a relation between
individual abilities and wages that also impacts on the observed relation be-
tween risk and wages. We therefore augment the basic model with individual
talent heterogeneity.
2.1 Including individual talent heterogeneity
Individuals have an innate talent 1 >q>0 that is drawn from a diﬀerentiable
population distribution G(q). This talent is interpreted as an eﬃciency unit.
This means the wages of someone who works with talent q and choice of
specialisation θ is qw(θ). We now conjecture that it will be the case that
all individuals with a certain talent will choose a particular θ and that this
implicit function q(θ) is either increasing or decreasing on its domain (a no-
crossing conditions). This conjecture will have to be con￿rmed ex post. The
eﬃciency units of labour supplied for speciality θ is then g(q(θ))
dq(θ)
dθ q(θ)h(θ).2










2In the more general case, the number of eﬃciency units should be written as R
x=q(θ) h(θ)x(θ)dG .








Individual utility maximization will now mean that at θ, an individual
with quality q(θ) is indiﬀerent in her choice:




For each quality level q, this requirement leads to an indiﬀerence curve on
the {θ,w} space. Applying the argument in the seminal paper by Rosen
(1972), this means that in equilibrium the wage curve w(θ) will be the en-
velope of these indiﬀerence curves, which in turn determines q(θ). In order
to calculate the equilibrium in any practical instance, we note that we can
simply trace the condition above for any w(0)t oa r r i v ea taw ( θ), which in
turn determines everything. We then pick that w(0) that is itself implied by
the outcomes. Proposition 3 gives conditions for uniqueness and of the main
relation of interest.
Proposition 3. i) The model with individual heterogeneity has a unique w(θ),
and hence a unique level of E{U(q)}. ii) The equilibrium is ineﬃcient for any
τ, though
dy
dτ|τ=0 > 0 and
dU(q)
dτ |τ=0 > 0. iii) Any continuous distribution of
observed wages is supported. iv) Individuals with q< b
w(1) are voluntarily un-
employed. v) Total wages always increase with talent (
dwq
dq > 0)b u tw i l lo n l y
decrease with risk (
dwq
d(1−h) < 0) when {u(x)−u(b)}(−
u00(x)
u0(x)x−1)+xu0(x) > 0,
which is the case whenever the degree of relative risk aversion is constant, or
doesn￿t cross 1.
Proof: see the Appendix.
We may note that
dwq
d(1−h) < 0 holds for most popular utility functions, such as
u(w)=l n ( a+w) with a>0,u (w)=wα with 0 < α < 1, and u(w)=1−e−αw
with α > 0. The intuition is that individuals with high innate talents can
￿buy￿ security by talking less risky professions that pay less per eﬃciency
unit. Observed total wages (= qw(q)) are then increasing in talent but de-
creasing in risks. In such cases, the observed relations of risks and wages is
spurious and due to innate talent heterogeneity. This is slightly diﬀerent to
the explanation given by Hwang et al. (1998) and Daniel and Sofer(1998).
In their models, the same empirical prediction arose because workers with
high bargaining power extracted surplus from eﬃcient ￿rms by having both
12higher wages and better amenities. In Hwang et al. (1998) this bargain-
ing power derived from the possibility of on-the-job-search in the presence
of heterogeneity in the productivity of ￿rms whereas in Daniel and Sofer
(1998) the bargaining power derived from the presence of a union. In the
model of this paper however, individual heterogeneity can cause a similar
relationship but does not rely on the presence of a market-distortion such as
some ￿rms that are not on the production frontier or the presence of unions.
Our explanation stresses unobserved diﬀerences in individual characteristics
which increase both wages and the preference for amenities and is therefore
more general. Because of the spurious relation between wages and risks on
the individual level, we expect diﬀerent relations between wages and risks on
the aggregate than on the individual level. We can for instance refer to Van
Vuuren and Van der Berg (2001) who ￿nd that risks and wages are positively
related at the sector level in the Netherlands, whereas risks and wages are
negatively related at the individual level in the Netherlands (e.g. Frijters et
al. 2001).
The main prediction about education that comes out of these static mod-
els is that the proportion of individuals into less specialised occupations is
higher in economies with lower levels of welfare. Now, the welfare system is
more generous and elaborate in the European and richer Asian countries than
it is in the US. Ashton and Greene (1996) extensively review the education
systems in most OECD countries and in the fast growing Asian countries.
They note that the education system in the US is indeed quite generalist.
Secondary and tertiary education in the US is based on many subjects, and
little specialisation takes place in formal education. Most of the European
and Asian countries on the other hand, have education systems that are much
more specialised. Tertiary education is much more focussed on a small sub-
s e to fs u b j e c t s ,a n de v e nm u c ho fs e c o n d a r ye d u c a t i o ni so c c u p a t i o n - s p e c i ￿c.
The extreme case is the vocational system in Germany were large proportions
of the population learn only very speci￿c skills.
3D y n a m i c s
We ￿rst extend the two-stage model above into an in￿nite horizon, continuous
time OLG model, where we focus exclusively on steady states. In order to
look at what happens after unanticipated shocks, we then set up an empirical
version of the model which we calibrate.
133.1 An analytical dynamic model
Consider an in￿nite-period continuous overlapping generations model with a
total measure of individuals equal to 1. Ex-ante homogenous individuals can
be unemployed, employed and can die. At a mortality rate m individuals
die, who are immediately replaced by a new individual. This new individual
chooses her specialisation and then starts out being unemployed. There
is a common discount rate ρ. T h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fs p e c i a l i s a t i o nc h o s e nb y
the individuals who enter into the economy at time s is denoted as fs(θ).
Calendar time is denoted by t. The job-arrival rate for the unemployed with
specialisation θ is denoted as λ(θ) > 0, and the job-destruction rate by
δ(θ) > 0. We de￿ne specialisation as
dλ(θ)
dθ < 0 and
dδ(θ)
dθ > 0.
The total measure of workers and unemployed with specialisation θ at
time 0 will equal
R 0
−∞ memsfs(θ)ds, where mems is the density of the indi-
viduals alive at 0 who are born at time s<0. The density of individuals
with specialisation θ who entered at time s employed at time t>0i st h e n




= λ(θ){1 − p(θ,e,t− s)} − δ(θ)p(θ,e,t− s)











∂2t < 0, and
limt→∞p(θ,t− s)=
λ(θ)
λ(θ)+δ(θ). The total population measure of individuals
with specialisation θ employed at time t is denoted as Gt(θ) and equal to R t







and wages solve wt(θ)=
∂yt
∂Gt(θ).
We can now ￿nd the Euler equations for the value of unemployment and
employment that characterise maximising behaviour. Denoting the expected
utility value of unemployment as V UN and the utility value of employment






EM = u((1 − τ)w(θ)) + δ(θ){V
UN − V
EM}
Solving these equations for V UN yields
(ρ+m)V
UN =








UN =( 1− a(θ))u(b)+a(θ)u((1 − τ)w(θ))
Looking only at RE stationary steady states, V UN has to be the same for
every θ. This means the solution has to satisfy
da(θ)
dθ





dθ < 0. Writing the continuous time model in this way has hence
given a solution equation that is virtually the same as in the static model, and
for which the arguments in proposition 1 apply. The solution equation again
maps out a unique w(θ) from any starting point w(0). From w(θ), we can
then map out a unique
G(θ)
G(0), which in turn uniquely determines a static f(θ)
and y. Because these in turn again lead to a unique w(0), there is a closing
equation that is continuous and which has to have at least one ￿xed point.
Existence is thereby assured. The arguments on uniqueness are the same
because it is again not possible to change G(θ) (via f(θ)) without making
some individuals strictly better and some others strictly worse oﬀ,w h i c hi s
not possible. Obviously, w(θ) increases in δ(θ) and decreases in λ(θ).
When it concerns eﬃciency and the role of τ, this dynamic model is
more problematic because there is no single risk parameter but there are
now two, i.e. λ(θ) and δ(θ).F o r e ﬃciency to hold, it has to be the case
that
∂y
∂f(θ) i st h es a m ef o ra l lθ. Using the fact that λ(θ)=∞ for θ =0
(which is just a normalisation), there has to hold for an eﬃcient f(θ) that
∂y
∂f(θ) = f(0)γ−1y1−γ = w(0). Denoting the eﬃcient solution as fe(θ) and











¯ p(θ) . We can hence examine the eﬃciency of the equilibrium
by checking whether w(θ)=
w(0)






















For eﬃciency to be possible, there would have to hold that
dw(θ)




dθ [u((1 − τ)w(θ)) − u(b)]






















from which it is clear that, under any τ, this condition can only be satis￿ed
by a linear utility function at particular parameter values. Hence, in general
the equilibrium is again never eﬃcient under any tax system.
In order to see whether we can follow the same arguments in the dynamic
c a s ea si nt h et w o - p e r i o dc a s ea b o u tt h ee ﬀect of increasing τ at τ =0 , we
can note that
dw(θ)





N o w ,i nt h ec a s et h a tρλ
0(θ) < −ρδ




¯ p(θ) which corresponds to ineﬃciently low risk-taking and
16whose characteristics would correspond to the 2-period case. Looking at
this condition, this will hold whenever the negative change in job-￿nding
rates is lower than the positive change in job-destruction rates. In these
circumstances, the introduction of an UB would thus again improve eﬃ-
ciency. Given that in most cases, job-destruction rates are lower than job-
creation rates (employment lasts longer than unemployment), the case that
the changes in job-￿nding rates are more important, seems the generic case.
However, in the less likely case that ρλ
0(θ) > −ρδ
0(θ), there holds that




¯ p(θ) in which case individuals take too much risk, even at
τ =0 . Hence we cannot a priori say whether taxes will be output increasing
or not. The reason behind this unexpected result is discounting: individuals
attach more value to what happens in the near future than output maximisa-
tion dictates. Then, simply because job-destruction can only occur at a later
date than getting a job, individuals attach a disproportionate importance to
λ
0(θ) and not enough to δ
0(θ). It is then possible that a too high proportion
of individuals take specialisations with a high job-destruction rate from an
output maximising point of view. Hence, surprisingly, whether aggregate
choices are too risky or not depends on the precise shape of λ(θ) and δ(θ),
although in all the parametric examples looked at in this paper, A(θ) > 1
(because in all applications δ
0(θ)=0already).
3.2 A calibrated dynamic model
In order to ￿nd out what happens when shocks occur to the underlying
parameters, we set up a calibrated version of the model to highlight the
main dynamics at work.
We look at a discrete time model with two choices of specialisation, high
and low. Ex ante identical individuals choose their specialisation at t=0, then
enter unemployment. After 20 periods they die. The population grows at a
rate n, meaning that the cohort that dies is replaced by a new cohort that is a
fraction (1+n)20 bigger. Because of the constant returns to scale production
function, population growth will not aﬀect anything in the steady state.
Population growth will however serve to ￿dampen out￿ ￿uctuations. Each
period a fraction βt of the new cohorts will choose general education, and
af r a c t i o n( 1 - βt) chooses specialist education. Those with general education
have job-￿nding rates equal to λ
H and job-destruction rates equal to δ
H.
Those with specialist education have job-￿nding rates equal to λ
S < λ
G and
17job-destruction rates equal to δ
S ≥ δ
H. Individuals are assumed to have
rational expectations and have logarithmic utility functions: u(x)=l n ( x +
A)α. Because we calibrate working lives, each period corresponds to about
2.5 years. Taking standard estimates for the discount rate from empirical
studies (e.g. Frijters and Van der Klaauw 2001), we take ρ equal to 10% a
year. There is no mortality before period 20.
We ￿rst show some baseline calculations of the steady state, where we





S} is calibrated on statistics from the US and the EU. In
line with Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998), we do not allow job-destruction rates





equal for both economies, in order to allow for proper comparisons of the
dynamics in the shock experiments. Also, the parameters were set such that
the level of specialists is much higher in in one economy, in order to be as-
sured that our risk-arguments have some relevance for the two economy. The
statistics we took into account are average job-￿nding rates, unemployment
rates, population growth rates in the last 30 years, job-destruction rates, and
level of UB. The underlying data is from the OECD.
Table with baseline functions.
Table 1: baseline callibrations for a high tax and a low tax economy.
￿EU￿ ￿US￿
Speci￿c inputs




wG ∗ (1 − τ) 0.89 0.98
wS ∗ (1 − τ) 0.96 1.50
bene￿ts 0.80 0.55
Average production 0.89 0.97
unemployment 0.17 0.04
utility -0.07 0.29
Common inputs: A=0.1, ρ per year=0.1, γ =0 .9, λ
G =0 .9, λ
S =0 .3, δ =0 .2
In the ￿EU￿ baseline model, we see that taxes and unemployment levels
are higher than in the ￿US￿ baseline model. Welfare is slightly higher in the
￿US￿. In the ￿US￿, output (per hour input), population growth, and wage-
diﬀerentials are also higher. The sensitivity to taxes is quite large: even
18though basic production possibilities are set equal for both economies, the
diﬀerences in the taxes translate to big diﬀerences in unemployment, though
the diﬀerences in bene￿ts are not that large.
We now turn to the eﬀect of unanticipated shocks. Starting from steady
state, we perturb the economy at t=0. We then assume that expectations
instantaneously realign themselves, i.e. after the shock all individuals know
what will happen next. We look at three diﬀerent shocks:
1. A recession. At t=0, δ is equal to 0.5, and λ
G and λ
S are halved. At
t=1 all parameters return to baseline.
2. A permanent biased search shock. At t=0, (1-λ
S) is halved.
3. A welfare system change. At t=0, τ is halved.
We show the results in graphs.


























The eﬀect of a recession corresponds somewhat to the historical data
on unemployment dynamics after the oil shocks of the 70￿s (Blanchard en
Wolfers, 1999): there is a similar initial drop in employment and output, but
in the ￿EU￿ the recovery in production and output takes about twice as long
because the number of specialists is much higher. The diﬀerent experience are
especially pronounced when we look at the development of β : the recession
temporarily increased the value of being a generalist. In the ￿US￿, where most
were generalists to begin with, this changed little, but in the ￿EU￿, this led
to big increases in β, which themselves created a ￿ripple-eﬀect￿ in subsequent
periods. For the aggregate though, this means that the levels of return to
work are smaller in the ￿EU￿. This is another explanation for the sluggishness
20with which the EU unemployment rates came down after the oil price shocks
in the 70￿s (Blanchard en Wolfers, 1999). Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998)
explained this same phenomenon by arguing that unemployment bene￿ts
increased the willingness of individuals to wait for better jobs. Sargent and
Ljungqvist combined this with the assumption that individual loose skills
in unemployment. Hence unemployment bene￿ts aggravated the negative
shocks in their model because the high unemployment bene￿ts indirectly
adversely changed the characteristics of individuals whilst they were already
on the labour market. The diﬀerence with this paper is that in this paper,
there is no resort to a reduction in skills during unemployment, but an eﬀect
of unemployment bene￿ts on the long term composition of the workforce.
In a sense, this calibrated model is set up such that the recovery is rela-
tively quick because new cohorts can immediately enter the labour force. If
we would allow for a period between the choise of education and entering the
labour market, the recovery of areas with many specialists would take much
longer.


























A permanent biased search shock has stronger eﬀects on the ￿EU￿ than
on the ￿US￿, simply because the proportion of specialists at the time of the
shock is much higher in the ￿EU￿. The risks associated with being a specialist
go down, which encourages more specialists. As an immediate eﬀect, entire
cohorts become specialists in the ￿US￿ and the ￿EU￿. This causes a ripple
eﬀect for the subsequent periods that slowly dies down. In the long run,
the proportion of specialists goes up in both economies. Also, production
increases. Unemployment barely changes in the ￿US￿. In the ￿EU￿, there is
an initial sharp drop in unemployment as more specialists ￿nd a job. In
the longer run however, the increased proportion of specialists, who still run
higher risks than the generalists, means that the initial employment gains
are reduced.


























The welfare system change increases the incentives to become generalist.
Because in the ￿US￿, the proportion of generalists was already very high, the
eﬀect of lowering τ on unemployment and β is small: production and unem-
ployment decrease very slightly. All that really changes is a large increase in
the wages of specialists (not shown). There are big eﬀects in the ￿EU￿, where
the changes in β are quite large, leading to long-lasting ripples. The eﬀect
on production and output is very delayed though, simply because it takes
time for new cohorts of generalists to come through the education system
and substantially change the composition of the labou force: it takes about 8
periods (≈20 years) before production and unemployment have reached their
new steady state. The long-term eﬀects are that production increases and
unemployment decreases because of the reduced numbers of specialists in the
23economy. These predictions seem to mirror the sluggishness with which un-
employment levels have been found to react to changes in the level of UB, and
indeed to other welfare changes (Blanchard en Wolfers 1999, 2001; Dolado
et al. 1996; Gruber and Wise 1997).
4 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper it is argued that unemployment bene￿ts increase the incen-
tives of individuals to make riskier educational investments, which at low
unemployment bene￿t levels increases expected welfare, total output and
unemployment. An area with high unemployment bene￿ts therefore also has
a higher number of specialists who have lower job-￿nding rates. This in turns
makes such an area more vulnerable to general shocks, because unemploy-
ment levels return less quickly back to their natural rate. Also, increasing
unemployment bene￿ts increases unemployment, but with a large delay be-
cause it takes time before the more specialist newer cohort who are more
frequently unemployed appear on the labour market. This is one explana-
tion for the lack of responsiveness in unemployment rates that is frequently
found for changes in unemployment bene￿t levels (e.g. Dolado et al, 1996;
Blanchard and Wolfers 2001). It also explains why the US unemployment
rates returned faster to a lower level after the 1970￿s oil price shocks, than
did their European counterparts.
Apart from UB, there are several other risk-pooling systems. Disability
bene￿ts, early retirement bene￿ts, and social welfare are obvious examples.
If there are early life choices that aﬀect the risks of these occurrences, then
the existence of this risk-pooling may lead to exactly the same dynamics as
UB does for unemployment: they will create delays between policy changes
and changes in average outcomes, and they may aﬀect both the distribution
and eﬃciency of actual outcomes.
When there are several risk-pooling systems for the same risks, the intro-
duction or expansion of one system may well aﬀect investments into other
systems. Maintaining close family and community ties for instance has as a
likely bene￿t that one can count on support in the event of unemployment
or other ￿nancial setbacks. In this sense, the maintenance and development
of certain forms of social ties is a form of risk sharing. Welfare bene￿ts then
change the incentives for investments in these social ties and hence change
the ￿social fabric￿ of an economy.
24Finally, the importance of long-term composition eﬀects and general equi-
librium eﬀects found in this paper casts doubt upon the usefulness of looking
at the partial eﬀects of changes in policy on individuals with given early life
choices.
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26Appendix
First, a useful result:
Lemma 1. When going from an initial distribution F1(θ) t oan e wd i s t r i -
bution F2(θ) with a continuous CES, wages will be higher for at least one θ
and wages will be lower for at least one θ.
Proof: consider the level θ
∗ =a r g θ max{
f2(θ)
f1(θ)}. If F2 6= F1, then there has to
hold that
f2(θ∗)
















































































Which implies that w2(θ
∗) <w 1(θ




f1(θ)}, we can see that there is also a θ
∗ for which w2(θ
∗) >w 1(θ
∗).
When f(θ) is continuous, the strict inequality implies that any change in
f(θ) means that a whole range of wages must decrease and another range of
wages must increase.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Uniqueness of w(θ). First, we note that the diﬀerential equation
−h
0(θ)(u(w(θ)) − u(0)) = (1 − τ)w
0(θ)h(θ)u
0(w(θ))
27de￿ning the equilibrium w(θ) is well-behaved in the sense that w(θ) is uniquely
determined by a w(0). Also,
∂w(θ)










f(0) is then solved by
R
fdθ =1 . The function f(θ,w(θ)) is also continu-
ous in w(θ). By implication of w(θ) being continuous in w(0), the implicit
function f(θ,w(0)) must therefore also be continuous in w(0).









Now, for w(0) ↓ 0, we ￿rst can note that at limw(0)↓0 the de￿ning condition





Translating this into f(θ), implies that the left-hand side of the above expres-
sion will converge to some positive number. For w(0) ↑∞ , we can note that
that in the limit, u0(w(θ)) b e c o m e sc o n s t a n t ,w h i c hi nt u r na g a i np i n sd o w n
the the left-hand side of the expression above to a ￿nite number. Because of
the continuity of f(θ,w(0)) the ￿xed-point theorem hence applies and there
must be at least some level w(0) for which the condition is satis￿ed.
Considering uniqueness, suppose there are two wage function w1 and w2
that are an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, take w2(0) >w 1(0).
Then, it has to be the case for w2 that all will prefer θ =0above any other
level θ unless w2(θ) >w 1(θ) for any θ>0. If this does not hold, there is a
positive mass of quality that will choose 0 and there will be no mass choosing
a quality slightly above 0. This in turn would mean w2(0) = 0, which can￿t
be the case. Hence, there can only be a second equilibrium if w2(θ) >w 1(θ)
for all θ > 0. As we know from lemma 1, this is an impossibility. If there is
an equilibrium, it hence has to be unique.
In this proof it was not necessary to assume that w0(θ) or f(θ) is con-
tinuous. This means we can include cases where h(θ) is not-continuous. In
such cases, we can apply the same proof, but simply note that w(θ) is then
de￿ned by the more general requirement that E{U(θ)} − E{U(0)} =0 . In
the text all the formulas are given for the continuous case though for ease of
exposition.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 .
28Our strategy for proving i) is to ￿rst prove that when taxation increases
from 0 to some arbitrarily small ε, that there will be a 1 > θ
∗ > 0 for which
w(θ) remains constant. Then, we will show that for all θ < θ
∗,w (θ) has
increased. For all other θ,w (θ) has decreased. Because w0(h) will still be
greater than w
h, we can then write the changes in w(θ) as a succession of
production-increasing changes, which establishes production improvements.
For θ
∗ we then shown that his utility has increased, which implies it has to










(1 − τ)hu0((1 − τ)w(h))
∗ [{−w(h)u




















1−h(1) >w (0) and that u((1 −
τ)w(θ))−u(b) < ((1−τ)w(θ)−b)u0(b) we hence know that
d dw
d(1−h)
dτ < 0 at θ =0
for τ close to 0. This in turn establishes that the whole wage function must
have changed. We denote the changed wage function as w(θ,ε).U s i n g t h e
same argument as in Lemma 1, we thus know that there has to be a whole
range of θ for which w(θ) has increased. Because of continuity, this also
means there will be a 1 > θ
∗ > 0 for which w(θ,ε)=w(θ).B e c a u s ew(θ,ε)
equalizes utility, this also implies that sign{w(θ,ε) − w(θ)} = sign{θ
∗ −
θ} : because the importance of the risk of unemployment has decreased,
taking more risks must have become relatively more attractive. This in turn
means that
d(f(θ,ε)−f(θ))
dθ > 0. For small ε we can write y(τ = ε) − y(τ =
0) =
R




is continuous in τ, dw
d(1−h) will still be greater than w
h for very small τ.H e n c e
we can still use that
dh(θ)w(θ)
dθ > 0, implying that y(τ = ε) − y(τ =0 )> 0.




dτ |τ=0,h=1 < −1 and that average wages
have increased, we also know that h(θ
∗) < (1−ε) and thereby that w(0,ε) >
(1 + ε)w(0). This in turn means that the wage increase at θ =0more than
oﬀsets the tax increase, which establishes a utility increase for all θ.
ii) First, we simply de￿ne τz as the τ that solves (1−τ)w(0,τ)=b(τ). For
this level of τ, dw
d(1−h) has to equal 0 because otherwise someone could increase




dτ |τ=τz > 0. This in turn would imply that if τ > τz, that dw
d(1−h) < 0
and that individuals would want to take as much risk of unemployment as
possible, which in turn means they would not want to work at all.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 .
i) Existence. We can follow the proof of the homogenous case by noting
that the main solution equation uniquely tracks out w(θ) as a function of






dθ g(q(0))q(0)h(0) and it is now
the function
R
x(θ)dG(x = q(θ)) that is uniquely, continuously and implicitly
de￿ned by w(0) and by the requirement that {q(θ)} = {0 ≤ x ≤ 1} ∪
{qw(θ) ≥ b}. Voluntary nuemployment arises for those q where qw(1) <b .
Uniqueness. Suppose the equilibrium is not unique. Without loss of
generality, take w2(0) >w 1(0). Then, it has to be the case that all with
quality q in a small region near q(0) will prefer θ =0above any other level θ
unless w2(θ) >w 1(θ) for θ > 0 also. If this does not hold, there is a positive
mass of quality that will choose 0 and there will be no mass choosing a quality
slightly above 0. This would in turn invalidate the initial assumption. By
forward induction, there can hence only be a second equilibrium if w2(θ) >
w1(θ) for all θ > 0. As we know from lemma 1, this is an impossibility. If
there is an equilibrium, it therefore has to be unique.
iii) and iv) The arguments on taxation and the observed wage distribution
trivially carry over from the homogeneous case.
v) First we will prove that it can never be the case that
dwq
dq < 0. For this
we note that E{U(q1)} >E {U(q2)} when q1 >q 2. It thus has to be the case
that h(q1){u((1−τ)q1w(q1))−u(b)}+u(b) >h (q2){u((1−τ)q2w(q2))−u(b)}+
u(b). Now, because of utility maximisation, we also know that h(q1){u((1 −
τ)q2w(q1))−u(b)}+u(b) ≤ h(q2){u((1−τ)q2w(q2))−u(b)}+u(b). Substracting
the second inequality from the ￿rst, we get h(q1){u((1−τ)q1w(q1))−u((1−
τ)q2w(q2))} > 0. In turn, this means that q1w(q1) >q 2w(q2). H e n c ew ei n d e e d
know that
dwq
dq > 0, i.e. total wages will be higher for individuals with higher
talents. We then know that
dwq
d(1−h) < 0 iﬀ d2h
dwdq > 0 because then individuals
with higher talent have a greater preference for less risk than those with less







u0(x)x − 1) + xu0(x)
{u(x) − u(b)}2
with x =( 1− τ)w(h). Noting that
−u00(x)
u0(x) x i st h ed e g r e eo fr e l a t i v er i s k
aversion (=σ), it immediately holds that d2h
dwdq > 0 if σ ≥ 1.A l s o , b e c a u s e
{u(x) − u(b)} ≤ xu0(x)(1 − xminb<a<x{
u00(a)
u0(x)}), the condition will also hold
when
−u00(x)x
u0(x) is constant or always less than 1.
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